tree b716022623e954d92ba17c8ce0eb9a1811b7b5c8
parent 9c2668ef77e75ea4d8a6c7d100b14643269caec3
author Igor Kostenko <work.kerogi@gmail.com> 1751562140 +0200
committer LIU Hao <lh_mouse@126.com> 1751714835 +0800
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crt/ssp: fix stack smashing protection bootstrapping

Fix stack protection bootstrapping issue where the guard initialization
function itself triggers false positive stack overflow detection.

This issue occurs when the mingw-w64 CRT library is built with GCC's
-fstack-protector-strong flag, which effectively renders any resulting
binary (whether statically or dynamically linked) corrupted. The final
binary crashes during startup, before it even reaches the main function.

The problem is that the init() function starts with __stack_chk_guard = 0
but initializes it to a random value, causing the stack protection check
to always fail (0 != random) at function exit.

By introducing attribute __no_stack_protector__ we prevent early testing
of the uninitialized guard value.

Signed-off-by: Igor Kostenko <work.kerogi@gmail.com>