tree deb67932401c0edf6c20c87316cd2cd8dc786b3a
parent d06a9560188fe468c183127f6f5a1e5202bb3ca3
author Igor Kostenko <work.kerogi@gmail.com> 1751562140 +0200
committer LIU Hao <lh_mouse@126.com> 1751854358 +0800
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crt/ssp: fix stack smashing protection bootstrapping

Fix stack protection bootstrapping issue where the guard initialization
function itself triggers false positive stack overflow detection.

This issue occurs when the mingw-w64 CRT library is built with GCC's
-fstack-protector-strong flag, which effectively renders any resulting
binary (whether statically or dynamically linked) corrupted. The final
binary crashes during startup, before it even reaches the main function.

The problem is that the init() function starts with __stack_chk_guard = 0
but initializes it to a random value, causing the stack protection check
to always fail (0 != random) at function exit.

By introducing attribute __no_stack_protector__ we prevent early testing
of the uninitialized guard value.

Signed-off-by: Igor Kostenko <work.kerogi@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit a0e69f7bc83a29b40e68355aac3e0c39b113b20f)
Signed-off-by: LIU Hao <lh_mouse@126.com>